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Abstract
Cognitive and linguistic theories of counterfactual language comprehension assume that counterfactuals
convey a dual meaning. Subjunctive-counterfactual conditionals (e.g., ‘If Tom had studied hard, he
would have passed the test’) express a supposition while implying the factual state of affairs (Tom has not
studied hard and failed). The question of how counterfactual dual meaning plays out during language pro-
cessing is currently gaining interest in psycholinguistics. Whereas numerous studies using off line measures
of language processing consistently support counterfactual dual meaning, evidence coming from online
studies is less conclusive. Here, we review the available studies that examine online counterfactual lan-
guage comprehension through behavioural measurement (self-paced reading times, eye-tracking) and
neuroimaging (electroencephalography, functional magnetic resonance imaging). While we argue that
these studies do not offer direct evidence for the online computation of counterfactual dual meaning, they
provide valuable information about the way counterfactual meaning unfolds in time and inf luences suc-
cessive information processing. Further advances in research on counterfactual comprehension require
more specific predictions about how counterfactual dual meaning impacts incremental sentence
processing.
1. Introduction
People often ponder over the alternatives to their earlier decisions and actions, consider
unrealized possibilities or engage in mere fabulous imaginations. What if I had chosen to study
another subject? Would Tom have passed the test if he had studied harder? Would I be able to f ly if I
had wings? These considerations are examples of counterfactual thought, and the conditional
‘If then’ construction is the canonical form in which such thought is expressed (e.g. Byrne 2002;
Roese et al. 2005).
Counterfactual thought is pervasive in everyday life (Roese 1997) and has various adaptive
functions. For example, counterfactual thought enables people to reason about the cause of
an event (Egan and Byrne 2015; Rips and Edwards 2013; Spellman and Mandel 1999) and
thereby plays an important role in the processing of learning from experience (Barbey et al.
2009; Byrne 1997). It also promotes emotions such as regret and relief, and as such helps to
regulate behaviour and emotions in order to adequately function in a physical and social
environment (Epstude and Roese 2008; Frith 2013). Counterfactual thinking is furthermore
associated with the understanding of the perspectives and beliefs of others, which might qualify
it as a developmental precursor of explicit Theory of Mind abilities (Peterson and Bowler 2000;
Riggs et al. 1998 but see Perner et al. 2004 for an alternative perspective). Counterfactual
thought is thus considered to be a highly complex cognitive capability that develops relatively
late in childhood (Rafetseder and Perner 2012, 2014) and that is often impaired along with© 2016 The Authors
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50 Eugenia Kulakova and Mante S. Nieuwlandother cognitive functions in clinical conditions like autism, depression, Parkinson and
schizophrenia (Grant et al. 2004; Hooker et al. 2000; McNamara et al. 2003; Quelhas et al. 2008).
According to cognitive accounts of counterfactual thought (Fauconnier 1994; Johnson-Laird
and Byrne 2002), the reason that counterfactuals are cognitively complex is that they trigger two
incompatible representations. For instance, ‘If I had wings, then I would be able to f ly’ expresses
(1) the suppositional but factually false state of the speaker having wings and being able to f ly,
while also expressing (2) that the speaker does not have wings and therefore relies on
conventional modes of transportation. This dual meaning is the characteristic feature of
counterfactuals. From a linguistic perspective, this dual meaning makes counterfactuality a
fascinating phenomenon that enables people to produce utterances that are factually false yet
truthful. Counterfactuals hence broaden the scope of communication and allow meaningful
conversation about topics beyond mere veridical statements. However, this f lexibility in the
way people use language may come at a cost. Is the representation of dual meaning costly in
terms of maintenance and processing compared to ‘singular’ meaning?
Here, we address this question in relation to language comprehension. How counterfactual
dual meaning plays out during language processing is currently gaining interest in psycholinguis-
tics. This may be the case because counterfactual language still poses an important challenge to
current models of discourse processing, given that these models do not readily explain the ability
to entertain competing representations for extended periods of time (e.g. Kintsch 1988;
McKoon and Ratcliff 1998). In particular, counterfactuals comprise several features whose im-
pact on online processing is still debated, including (implicit) negation, non-factual supposition
and (pragmatic) inference generation. Thus, the impact of incompatible factual and
counterfactual representations on incremental sentence comprehension remains unclear. What
are the language processing correlates of counterfactual dual meaning assumed in cognitive
theory? Does dual meaning make a counterfactual more difficult to understand? The present
article reviews research that has tackled these questions using online measures (self-paced reading,
eye-tracking, electroencephalography (EEG) and functional resonance imaging ( fMRI)). Online
studies focus on the naturally unfolding, incremental extraction of meaning from linguistic
information during comprehension. In contrast, off line tasks collect meta-linguistic judgments
after linguistic content has been presented and processed, which makes them particularly useful
to study explicit counterfactual reasoning and inference generation. Although such studies
repeatedly support the accessibility of counterfactual dual meaning, their results can be distorted
by response strategies andmeta-linguistic knowledge. In particular, collecting explicit behavioural
responses may introduce processing steps that would not occur during reading for a more ‘regular’
or ‘passive’ mode of comprehension (Chwilla et al. 1995; Hahne and Friederici 2002). The
current review therefore focuses on the available evidence for or against dual representation
during online counterfactual processing.1.1. WHAT ARE COUNTERFACTUALS?
As the name suggests, counterfactuals are sentences that describe events or situations that are
counter-to-fact, hence factually false. The canonical form to express a counterfactual is a counter-
factual conditional, which has a factually false antecedent (i.e. ‘if’ part) that is taken as
suppositionally true (Byrne 2002). The antecedent ‘If I had wings’ expresses a non-factual
affirmative state that I have wings but also implicitly conveys its negation that I do not have wings.
In simple (non-conditional) counterfactuals, this feature can be described as the reversal of the
polarity of the initial sentence structure (Van Linden and Verstraete 2008). Similar to condi-
tionals, simple counterfactuals convey a positive statement together with its negation. The
utterance ‘I should have called my mother’ conveys the proposition ofme having called my mother© 2016 The Authors
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is therefore a special case of polarity reversal. Both have the effect that the compositional
suppositional proposition becomes enriched by its negation, adding up to a dual meaning.1.2. PRAGMATIC ACCOUNTS OF COUNTERFACTUAL MEANINGDifferent accounts exist about the linguistic-pragmatic mechanisms for generating counterfac-
tual dual meaning. For instance, Van Linden and Verstraete (2008) describe polarity reversal
of simple counterfactuals in terms of scalar implicatures associated with past-tense modal expres-
sions (e.g. would, might, should, could) (see also Ziegeler 2003). Based on the Gricean maxim of
Quantity (Make your contribution as informative as required; Grice 1975), modal expressions impli-
cate the non-applicability of the non-modal, much in the same way that the scalar quantifier
some pragmatically implicates not all (Levinson 2000). On a scalar ordering of informativeness,
non-modal assertions are more informative thanmodal expressions because non-modals convey
facts rather than mere possibilities. Thus, uttering the informatively weaker modal expression
implicates that the epistemically stronger non-modal does not hold, thereby giving rise to the
negated factual meaning.
Other common explanations focus more strongly on counterfactual conditionals and explain
antecedent falsity in terms of presuppositions associated with subjunctive mood (Karawani
2014; Levinson 1983; Stalnaker 1975; von Fintel 2012)1. Subjunctive mood is a verb form
strongly associated (and sometimes equated) with counterfactuality. In the study of conditionals,
subjunctive mood (If Tom had studied hard, he would have passed the test) historically has been
contrasted with indicative mood (If Tom studied hard, he passed the test), which expresses hypo-
thetical thought and lacks reference to factual events (Adams 1970). The presupposition account
posits that speakers use subjunctive mood to express something that both speaker and listener
know to be false. This overt signal prevents the listener to take the false utterance either as a
lie (because the speaker does not expect the listener to believe it) or as an error (because the
listener knows that the speaker knows that it is false), thereby maintaining the speaker’s
truthfulness. In cases where the presupposed factual information is initially unknown to the
listener, it can be derived from the subjunctive antecedent and accommodated, thus added to
the knowledge of the state of affairs.
Linguistic explanations of counterfactual meaning thus assume that some form of pragmatic
reasoning, based on cooperative principles between speaker and hearer, is involved in counter-
factual sentence comprehension. This harbours possible predictions about the online processing
consequences of counterfactuals. Some accounts assume that pragmatic implication generation
is costly and only occurs when it is essential for comprehension (Sperber andWilson 1986). This
suggests that not all participants will infer counterfactual dual meaning in all situations. The
availability of implied factual meaning would be determined by participants’ standard of rele-
vance, which would in turn depend on their cognitive capacities, their sensitivity to social-
communicative cues as well as task-dependent incentives to derive the inference (Nieuwland
et al. 2010). Other accounts assume automatic inference generation but predict increased pro-
cessing costs once implications have to be cancelled (Levinson 2000). This suggests that in-
creased processing demands should only occur when implied factual meaning is explicitly
violated and thus has to be revised. Although the processing consequences implied by pragmatic
theories deserve more attention and elaboration in the psycholinguistic study of counterfactuals,
they might not fully capture counterfactual dual meaning. This is because they are mainly con-
cerned with the derivation of counterfactuals’ ‘second’ (i.e. factual) meaning, while saying little
about the suppositional ‘first’ one. Psycholinguistic research has therefore focused on potential© 2016 The Authors
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theories.1.3. COGNITIVE THEORY AND THE DUAL MEANING OF COUNTERFACTUALS1.3.1. The Mental Space Framework
Fauconnier (1994) formalized the dual representation of counterfactuals within the cognitive
semantic framework of mental spaces. Mental spaces are abstract cognitive domains that are used
to describemental representations and processes that underlie thought and language.Within this
framework, counterfactual conditionals are considered as mental space builders, carrying infor-
mation that deviates from their preceding ‘parent’ space representing factual events. Counterfac-
tual mental spaces per definition contain information that is incompatible with their factual
parent space, which is also the case for mentalist expressions like false beliefs, unrealized wishes
and even negations. The mental spaces framework thus explicitly posits a dual cognitive
representation of counterfactuals. However, this framework does not formulate clear, testable
predictions regarding dual representation. It does not specify whether and when building of a
new mental space incurs a processing cost, or for how long such novel spaces are maintained.
Nevertheless, the framework offers an intuitively plausible formalization of counterfactuality
and captures the phenomenon of dual meaning in counterfactual conditionals and non-conditional
constructions (e.g. wishes) alike.
1.3.2. Mental Model Theory
Mental model theory (MMT) is a theory of human reasoning put forward by Johnson-Laird and
Byrne (2002) that offers some explicit processing predictions of counterfactual dual meaning.
MMT represents the content of reasoning and inference processes as iconic mental representa-
tions (so-called ‘mental models’). Indicative and subjunctive-counterfactual conditionals trigger
different mental models. MMT assumes that people understand an indicative conditional
sentence (If A then B) by constructing a mental model of the suppositional state only (A and B).
In contrast, people understand counterfactual conditionals by representing two possibilities (Byrne
2005), the suppositional state (A and B) as well as the implied factual event (non-A and non-B).
Reasoning research has indeed revealed judgment differences as a function of the linguistic mood
in which conditional premises are presented. Compared to indicative conditionals, subjunctive
conditionals more often elicit inferences about the factual model (non-A and non-B), suggesting
that factual events are more accessible after counterfactuals.
MMT has not remained unchallenged despite having received a large amount of experimen-
tal support (e.g. Byrne and Egan 2004; Byrne and Tasso 1999; Thompson and Byrne 2002). Its
major antagonist is the suppositional theory (ST) developed by Evans and colleagues (Evans
2007; Evans and Over 2004). In contrast to MMT, ST denies a general difference between
the way indicative and subjunctive conditionals are processed during reasoning. Instead, both
kinds of conditionals are assumed to be evaluated with respect to suppositional possibilities in
which the consequent (B) is true in the context of the antecedent (A). As both MMT and ST
are theories of conditional reasoning (i.e. inferences carried out with counterfactual premises),
they are limited in their application to the study of online sentence comprehension. Although
MMT suggests that constructing and manipulating twomodels require more working-memory
resources compared to onemodel ( Johnson-Laird and Byrne 1991), it does little to explain how
the counterfactual dual model is established in the first place. ST acknowledges that counterfac-
tuals can imply opposite facts, but distinguishes this second meaning as a pragmatic rather than© 2016 The Authors
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proaches use linguistic content for studying subsequent reasoning behaviour, the psycholinguis-
tics of counterfactual meaning asks how people compute meaning from linguistic content, as
online reasoning processes and sentence comprehension unfold hand-in-hand.1.4. OFFLINE STUDIES OF COUNTERFACTUAL DUAL MEANING
Off line measures of sentence comprehension consistently suggest that the dual meaning of
counterfactuals is accessible after people read counterfactuals. Carpenter (1973) tested how
information is extracted from counterfactuals using a sentence-probe task. Participants read
two-clause sentences in either indicative or subjunctive mood (Mary stayed, since Judy
(would have) lived) followed by sentence verification probes that either restated or contrasted
one of the clauses (Judy lived or Judy died, respectively). Participants had to indicate whether
the probes matched the factual events implied by the sentence. When the probe was presented
immediately after the two-clause sentence, responses to matching probes took longer than
responses to mismatching probes following subjunctive but not following indicative sentences.
However, when the probe appeared after 5 seconds, all the matching probes triggered faster
responses. Carpenter therefore proposed a multistage processing model wherein people initially
represent counterfactuals in a negated form ( false (Judy lived)) and subsequently convert them
into an affirmative representation of their factual meaning (Judy died). However, the task
encouraged participants to systematically ignore counterfactual’s suppositional meaning, which
made it rather artificial and prone to invite response strategies. Furthermore, the question
remains how the implication of a counterfactual without a clear antonym (e.g. Judy would have
laughed) can be represented more economically, i.e. without negation.
With a sentence recognition task, Fillenbaum (1974) demonstrated that participants infer
counterfactually implied factual information even without the explicit instruction to do so.
Negative declarative sentences (He didn’t catch the plane) were incorrectly rated as previously pre-
sented more often when they followed a causal counterfactual (If he had caught the plane he would
have arrived on time) than when they were in fact new. Although this study lacked a matched in-
dicative control condition, this result supports a dual representation view, as the counterfactually
implied factual meaning was accessed and memorized before subjects were instructed about the
subsequent task and could opt for a response strategy.
A series of studies conducted by de Vega et al. (2012; 2007) addressed how counterfactual
dual meaning was maintained over time. Participants read vignettes describing a situation (John
was still in the office sitting in front of the computer. He started to type a report that his boss had asked him
for), followed by a factual (As he had enough time, he went to the café to drink a beer) or a counterfac-
tual continuation (If he had had enough time, he would have gone to the café to drink a beer). Then a
probe was presented after the continuation that was either related to the initial (‘type’) or the
new (‘drink’) situation. Positive responses for matching initial-related probes were faster in
counterfactual compared to factual contexts, whereas new-situation probes did not differ
(Experiment 2). Based on these results, de Vega et al. (2007) proposed that counterfactuals
momentarily activated a dual representation, which, due to being cognitively demanding,
was given up in favour of the representation of initial factual events. The authors argued that
the suppositional meaning of counterfactuals therefore did not contribute to the build-up of a
discourse representation. A related study (de Vega and Urrutia 2012) varied the temporal
interval between probe-presentation. A delay of 1500ms but not of 500ms produced the initial
effect, suggesting that counterfactuals’ suppositional meaning was accessible after 500ms, but
not after 1500ms anymore. The results support the authors’ hypothesis that counterfactual
meaning is only brief ly represented. However, in the employed stimuli, the probe task was© 2016 The Authors
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may be a strategic adaption to these stimuli that the suppositional meaning was not represented
for a longer time, since it was never required.
A more explicit approach to show accessibility to counterfactual dual meaning was used by
Thompson and Byrne (2002). Employing a multiple-choice task which presented various
interpretations for each item, the authors asked participants what information was implied by
counterfactual conditionals (If Sarah had gone to Moose Jaw then Tom would have gone to Medicine
Hat). Implication of the opposite factual events was indicated by roughly 50% of participants.
This number could be increased to 67% by using causal (If the butter had been heated, then it would
have melted) and definitional (If the card had had a jack on it, then it would have been a face card) content
(Experiment 2). The results demonstrate a rather heterogeneous sample, suggesting strong
individual differences in the way people assess counterfactual implications. Similarly, Grant
et al. (2012) showed that simple declarative sentences withmodal verbs also carry a counterfactual
meaning. Test sentences (e.g., This information should be released) made 89% of participants infer
that in fact The information was not released, suggesting a counterfactual reading of the sentence.
Similar results were obtained for other modals.
Taken together, off line results seem to support the dual representation view. They
consistently show that when given the task to access or evaluate counterfactually implied facts,
participants tend to do so. However, given the limitations of off line studies, it remains unclear
whether dual meaning is computed spontaneously during counterfactual sentence processing or
established in order to complete a given task.2. Online Studies of Counterfactual Sentence Processing
In contrast to off line studies, online methods can track counterfactual dual meaning computa-
tion using more direct markers of semantic processing on a word-by-word basis. Most com-
monly, counterfactuals have been studied with self-paced reading, eye-tracking, EEG and
fMRI. In self-paced reading studies, sentences are presented word-by-word or in multi-word
segments, while participants pace the presentation via button press. This aims to measure com-
prehension by looking at the time participants require to move to the next segment or word.
Novel, unexpected or contextually implausible words take longer to process, as also suggested
by eye-tracking studies (Rayner 1998; Rayner 2009). Compared to self-paced reading,
eye-tracking does not interfere with the natural reading mode by artificially partitioning the
stimulus. Instead, participants read a complete sentence or paragraph while their eye-
movements are continuously recorded. This provides reading times per part of the sentences
and allows the calculation of additional measures. For instance, participants might re-read earlier
passages to resolve initial difficulties with an encountered word. While self-paced reading and
eye-tracking measures provide valuable behavioural information, EEG has the great advantage
to provide the neurophysiological correlates of language processing by measuring scalp-
recorded electric potentials elicited by neuronal activity. In EEG studies on written language
comprehension, sentences are typically presented in a pre-set pace word-by-word. Averaging
electric signals that co-occur with the presentation of a critical word produces event-related-
potentials (ERPs) with specific latencies, peak amplitudes and topographic distributions. The
ERP component most strongly associated with language processing, the N400 (Kutas and
Hillyard 1980), peaks around 400ms after word-onset and has a centro-parietal distribution.
N400 amplitude is thought to index the ease of retrieving conceptual knowledge associated
with a word in a given context (Kutas and Federmeier 2000). Lower (less negative-going)
N400 amplitudes ref lect the facilitation of semantic retrieval, for example by a related word
or a coherent sentence or discourse. The N400 amplitude therefore also ref lects whether a© 2016 The Authors
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does not allow the precise localization of neural activity that produces the scalp-recorded ERPs.
Therefore, fMRI has been employed in the study of sentence processing, even though its tem-
poral imprecision does not qualify it as an online measure. With the temporal resolution of
about 2 seconds fMRI provides spatially fine-grained information about brain regions that are
involved in language processing. All these online measures are collected while participants are
reading (or listening to) a narrative with no principled need of an additional task. The accessi-
bility of a concept can therefore be measured at each word during the incremental build-up
of sentence meaning without potential interference from task-oriented processing.
The dual representation of factual and suppositional meaning during counterfactual sentence
comprehension could have various processing consequences. On one hand, the initial build-up
of dual meaning could be costly compared to ‘singular’meaning, because dual meaning requires
a more elaborate situation model that encompasses the representation of explicitly contradicting
information. These increased processing demands might occur early during counterfactual
sentence processing, when people process the counterfactual antecedent. On the other hand,
once counterfactual dual meaning is computed, it would increase the accessibility and facilitate
the processing of information that is related to both meanings. Online studies of counterfactual
sentence comprehension can thus be roughly grouped by whether the words at which
processing is probed (i.e. critical words) are located in the counterfactual antecedent where dual
meaning is constructed, or in the counterfactual consequent or even in a subsequent sentence.2.1. PROCESSING THE COUNTERFACTUAL ANTECEDENT
Only a few studies have investigated the accessibility of a counterfactual meaning by collecting
online measures during the processing of counterfactual antecedents. In a self-paced reading-
time study, Stewart et al. (2009; see alsoHaigh and Stewart 2011) presented three different types
of context sentences (Darren was not athletic/was very athletic/enjoyed meeting new people), which
rendered a subsequent subjunctive conditional (If Darren had been athletic, he could have tried out
for the rugby team) contextually consistent, inconsistent or neutral. The critical segment within
the antecedent (athletic, he) was read faster when it was contextually consistent than when it
was inconsistent or neutral. This result suggests that counterfactual antecedents are rapidly
evaluated with respect to previous information, with mismatch between counterfactually
implied and explicitly stated factual events resulting in slower reading. No such slow-down
was observed for contextually inconsistent indicative conditionals (If Darren was athletic, he tried
out for the rugby team), suggesting that readers relate indicative and subjunctive conditionals to
contextual information in different ways. In particular, readers expect the subjunctive anteced-
ent to be false in respect to prior information, suggesting an immediate effect of counterfactuals’
pragmatic constrains of antecedent falsity on the unfolding discourse. Interestingly, readers also
read the neutral antecedent slower than the contextually consistent antecedent. This effect was
taken to ref lect implication generation in order to infer factually implied events of the counter-
factual antecedent. However, no neutral control condition in indicative mood was presented to
dissociate whether increased reading times were in fact due to counterfactual dual meaning.
Therefore, the results may only ref lect the lack of lexical overlap and discourse coherence
between the neutral context sentence and the counterfactual antecedent.
In an ERP study on German sentence processing, Kulakova et al. (2014) investigated the
processing of counterfactual and indicative antecedents without preceding context. The authors
examined whether counterfactual antecedents are associated with additional processing costs
due to dual meaning computation. They compared ERPs to verbs in subjunctive/indicative
mood (Wenn die Würfel gezinkt wären/waren; translation: If the dice had been rigged/were rigged).© 2016 The Authors
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time window compared to the indicate mood verbs. The authors interpreted this effect as an
instance of the left anterior negativity (LAN), a physiological signature of increased working
memory demands in syntactic but also semantic processing (Krott and Lebib 2013; Matzke
et al. 2002). Under this interpretation, the incremental computation of counterfactual anteced-
ents increases working memory demands as soon as counterfactuality becomes apparent.
Whereas the observed ERP effect could not be explained by cloze or frequency values of the
critical verbs, further research is needed to tease apart the effects of linguistic mood from effects
of the specific word form. In addition, the nature of the cognitive processing costs (inference
generation, inhibition of factual knowledge, dual meaning maintenance, etc.) remains to be
identified.
Taken together, there is indirect support of increased processing costs associated with dual
meaning generation in counterfactual antecedents. However, none of the available studies
completely rule out alternative explanations for these effects.2.2. PROCESSING NARRATIVE FOLLOWING A COUNTERFACTUAL CONTEXT
The majority of studies on online counterfactual sentence comprehension investigated the
impact of a counterfactual context on the processing of subsequent phrases. For example,
Santamaría et al. (2005) (see also Gómez-Veiga et al. 2010) presented either indicative or
counterfactual context sentences (If there are/had been roses, then there are/had been lilies) and
measured participants’ (self-paced) reading times for subsequent affirmative or negated
declarative sentences about these events (e.g. There were (no) roses, and there were (no) lilies).
Participants read negated sentences faster after subjunctive compared to indicative conditionals,
whereas no difference occurred for affirmative sentences. These results can be taken to ref lect
dual meaning, as counterfactuals facilitated the reading of the implied (negated) factual events
without slowing down the processing of supposed (positive) events.
In a related eye-tracking experiment, Ferguson (2012) presented counterfactual conditional
or factual declarative context sentences (If/Because Joanne had remembered her umbrella, she would
have had/had avoided the rain) followed by a factual sentence that included a critical word that
was either consistent or inconsistent with the preceding context (Joanne’s hair was dry/wet).
One early measure of processing difficulty showed that counterfactual inconsistencies were im-
mediately detected, increasing the tendency to re-read earlier regions. However, the general
pattern showed that critical words were read fastest when they were consistent with the factual
context and slowest when they were inconsistent with the factual information. In contrast,
following a counterfactual context, both consistent and inconsistent critical words were read
equally slow, but faster than inconsistent words in a factual context. Contextual consistency
with a factual context thus had different effects than consistency with a counterfactual context,
which the author attributed to a dual representation of counterfactuals. A sustained representa-
tion of dual meaning was assumed to make counterfactuals more demanding in terms of
processing resources, leaving fewer resources to anomaly detection. These results are intriguing,
although alternative explanations are possible. It remains to be examined whether these findings
ref lect difficulty with processing conditionals (compared to factual sentences) or whether they
are indeed specifically ref lecting counterfactual meaning. It is also possible that participants had
difficulty switching from a counterfactual scenario back to factual events.
Similar findings were presented in an EEG study that used materials similar to those from de
Vega’s (2007) off line design (Urrutia et al. 2012a). An initial situation (Marta wanted to plant
f lowers) was followed by either a factual (Because she found a spade, she started to dig a hole) or a
counterfactual (If she had found a spade, she would have started to dig a hole) continuation. EEG© 2016 The Authors
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initial (Marta bought a spade in the market) or new events (Marta planted some roses in the ground).
Initial-related continuations elicited increased frontal negativities after (inconsistent) factual
compared to (consistent) counterfactual contexts. In contrast, counterfactual-inconsistent
(new-related) phrases did not show such effect. Unfortunately, initial and new continuations
were not matched for lexical-semantic factors, preventing a clear interpretation of this finding.
Furthermore, the frontal distribution of the sustained negativity suggests an effect other than an
N400 effect. The authors argued for a similarity with frontal effects elicited by ambiguous words
that are held in working memory until the point of disambiguation (Hagoort and Brown 1994),
which is reminiscent of the working memory-related negativity-effects described by Kulakova
et al. (2014) in counterfactual antecedents. Taken together, the studies of Ferguson (2012) and
Urrutia et al. (2012a) point at increased working memory demands elicited by counterfactual
sentences.
In a recent ERP study, Ferguson and Cane (2015) directly investigated the impact of individ-
ual working memory capacity on the processing of narrative following counterfactuals. Partic-
ipants read counterfactual or factual sentences (If/Because David had been wearing his glasses, he
would have read/was able to read the poster easily) followed by simple factual or counterfactual
phrases (From this distance, David (would have) found that the words were clear/blurry) manipulating
consistency. The authors investigated N400 effects of contextual consistency in three
combinations of the two sentences: factual-factual, counterfactual-counterfactual and
counterfactual-factual. The low working-memory group showed N400 inconsistency effects
only in factual-factual conditions. In contrast, high working-memory participants showed
inconsistency effects in both factual-factual and counterfactual-counterfactual conditions.
Although no online effect of inconsistency was observed in counterfactual-factual conditions,
off line cloze ratings indicated that participants produced consistent continuations when given
enough time. The authors concluded that representing counterfactual narrative was cognitively
more demanding compared to processing factual sentences, so that only high working-memory
participants showed inconsistency effects after a counterfactual context. Switching from
counterfactual to factual phrases was argued to be even more effortful and as such no inconsis-
tency effects occurred even in the high working-memory group. These results substantiate the
interpretation of earlier findings (Ferguson 2012). Further studies are required to establish
whether these findings ref lect the impact of working memory capacity on counterfactual dual
meaning or rather on more general processes such as attention or depth of processing.
The counterfactual materials discussed so far all describe realistic situations, alternative courses
of events that could realistically have taken place. However, some counterfactuals ref lect
considerations of impossible events (e.g. If I had wings). For such sentences, the factual meaning
(I don’t have wings) is directly accessible from general real-world knowledge. Several studies in-
vestigated how real-world knowledge inf luences the build-up of counterfactual meaning, in
particular how people evaluate the consequences of counterfactuals that contradict factual world
knowledge. In an eye-tracking study, Ferguson and Sanford (2008; Experiment 2) presented
counterfactual context sentences that were inconsistent with world knowledge (If cats were veg-
etarians they would be cheaper for owners to look after). These were either followed by a sentence that
was contextually consistent but contradicted world knowledge (Families could feed their cat a bowl
of carrots), or a sentence that was inconsistent with the counterfactual context but consistent with
world knowledge ( feed their cat a bowl of fish). The control condition was a factual context sen-
tence (Evolution dictates that cats are carnivores and cows are vegetarians). Similar to the results of
Ferguson (2012), the world knowledge consistency effect was greatest following the factual
context, whereas total reading times did not reveal an effect of counterfactual consistency. These
results suggest that representation of counterfactual dual meaning is cognitively demanding and© 2016 The Authors
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placed by would; Experiment 3) yielded different results. Following counterfactual context, con-
sistent words were read longer than inconsistent words, whereas this pattern was reversed
following factual context. This result suggests that real-world knowledge was more accessible
than the consequences consistent with the counterfactual situation. In an ERP study, Ferguson
et al. (2008) probed the same critical words (carrots vs. fish) following a counterfactual context.
The consistent word carrots triggered stronger N400 amplitudes. Unfortunately, the critical
words were not controlled for predictability and semantic relatedness with the preceding con-
text, both variables known to inf luence the N400 amplitude (Federmeier et al. 2007). This
makes it difficult to decide whether in both the eye-tracking and ERP studies the word carrots
was more difficult to process because it was false in respect to world knowledge or simply be-
cause another counterfactual-consistent word (e.g. vegetables) was expected instead ( for discus-
sion, see Nieuwland and Martin 2012). In fact, an eye-tracking study in which similar,
spoken sentences were accompanied by pictures of carrots or fish (but no other edible items)
showed that participants looked at the consistent stimulus of both counterfactual and factual
conditions right after the onset of the verb ( feed). This speaks for an early contextual expectation
effect without any bias towards world knowledge (Ferguson et al. 2010).
Nieuwland and Martin (2012) examined a related question in an EEG study using critical
words that were equally expected from a counterfactual or a real-world context. Participants
read counterfactual or factual sentences regarding historical events (If N.A.S.A. had not developed
its Apollo Project, the first country to land on the moon would have been Russia/America, surely/Because
N.A.S.A. developed its Apollo Project, the first country to land on the moon was America/Russia, surely).
The critical word in the consequent (Russia/America) was either consistent or inconsistent with
the initial scenario. Although counterfactually inconsistent words referred to factually true
events, they produced significantly higher N400 amplitudes than counterfactually consistent
but factually true critical words. This suggests that the counterfactual context completely elim-
inated the difficulty to integrate a factually false consequent. Nieuwland (2013) extended this
finding to biologically and physically absurd counterfactuals (If dogs had gills, Dobermans would
breathe under water without problems). ERPs elicited at the critical word (water) did not differ from
factually true sentences (Because fish have gills, tuna breathe under water without problems). In general,
these results seem to be at odds with a dual representation of counterfactuals, as only the suppo-
sitional meaning inf luenced critical word processing. However, these studies used different
control conditions in order to establish the N400 effect between consistent and inconsistent
words, either the factually true alternative (America) or a semantically unrelated (poison) word.
It is possible that although the counterfactually consistent word (Russia) is processed more f lu-
ently than the factually true word (America), an unrelated word (e.g. Austria) is even more diffi-
cult to process. Likewise,Dobermans would breathe under airmay be counterfactually incongruent
and unexpected, but still more accessible than poison. This makes it difficult to relate these results
to counterfactual dual meaning, as they were designed for a different purpose and lack a critical
contrast.2.3. FUNCTIONAL NEUROIMAGING OF COUNTERFACTUAL SENTENCE COMPREHENSIONFunctional neuroimaging studies show that counterfactual thinking and reasoning rely on
multiple cognitive functions including mentalizing, cognitive control and emotional processing
(see Van Hoeck et al. 2015 for review). The majority of fMRI studies used short cues that
referred to (autobiographical) situations to trigger counterfactual evaluation and reasoning
processes (De Brigard et al. 2015; Van Hoeck et al. 2010, 2012). In contrast, only few studies© 2016 The Authors
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of counterfactual dual meaning.
Nieuwland (2012) employed the historical counterfactual stimuli from Nieuwland and
Martin (2012) in an fMRI study. Counterfactuals activated brain regions in bilateral middle
temporal gyri to a stronger extent than factual sentences. These regions are involved in the
retrieval of word meaning from long-term memory and sentence-level integration (Snijders
et al. 2010; Price 2010). More focused analyses in frontal regions revealed differential responses
to consistency violations in counterfactual compared to factual sentences. Inconsistent counter-
factual sentences elicited stronger frontal activations that were more pronounced in the right
compared to the left hemisphere. These effects were not detectable with EEG (Nieuwland
and Martin 2012), which highlights the advantage of employing different methods that are
sensitive to the activation of different neural populations at varying time-scales. The results speak
for the specific involvement of the right hemisphere during counterfactual sentence
comprehension. The right hemisphere is assumed to contribute to inferencing and establishing
contextual coherence during sentence processing ( Jung-Beeman 2005; Kuperberg et al. 2006;
Virtue et al. 2006). In turn, right-hemisphere damage is associated with pragmatic language
deficits (Martin and McDonald 2003).
The prevalent involvement of the right hemisphere was further supported by an fMRI study
by Kulakova et al. (2013). Factual sentences (The motor is switched off today) were followed by
either a counterfactual conditional that explicitly contradicted the presented facts (If the motor
had been switched on today, would it have burned fuel?) or by a conditional in indicative mood that
did not refer to the initial events (If the motor was switched on yesterday, did it burn fuel?). In contrast
to indicative sentences, counterfactuals activated right lateralized regions in the cuneus and cau-
date nucleus. As stimuli were presented in two modalities – aurally and visually – the activation
in occipital regions could not be attributed to visual perception. Instead, it was assumed to
mirror mental imagery processes. These findings were taken to support a dual representation
of counterfactuals as proposed by MMT, with increased iconic representation demands of the
counterfactual sentence.
Taking an embodied perspective, Urrutia et al. (2012b) tested the difference between the
sensory-motor representation of counterfactuals and factual sentences. Participants listened to
factual and counterfactual statements referring to actions that varied in their degree of motor ef-
fort (Since/If Pedro (had) decided to paint the room, he is moving/would have moved the photograph/sofa).
Regardless of physical effort, counterfactuals elicited increased activations in left superior frontal
regions, bilateral hippocampal gyri, as well as right inferior temporal gyrus. The authors
concluded that more cognitive effort was required to process counterfactual compared to factual
sentences. Since two meanings of counterfactuals were assumed to be active at the same time,
frontal activations were interpreted to ref lect the cognitive cost of managing or inhibiting
two conf licting action representations. In this comparison, however, effects of different
sentence structure cannot be disentangled from supposed effects of counterfactual dual meaning.
So far, fMRI studies of counterfactual sentence processing show a rather fragmented picture.
Nevertheless, one emerging pattern is that counterfactuals elicit stronger brain activations
compared to their factual or hypothetical control conditions. In fact, none of the reported
studies found regions that were activated stronger by the opposite contrasts. This is in line with
a more costly representation or higher processing demands of counterfactuals. However, more
studies are required to identify the exact cognitive cause of the surplus activation. A more
focused prediction could be that if counterfactual and factual representations are in competition
with one another, counterfactuals should elicit increased activations in brain regions associated
with semantic competition and semantic selection such as the left inferior prefrontal cortex
(e.g. Thompson-Schill et al. 2005).© 2016 The Authors
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We started this review with an overview of the dual meaning assumption in cognitive and
linguistic accounts of counterfactual meaning. In fact, there seems to be so little doubt about
a dual meaning in theory that it is rather regarded as a defining characteristic of counterfactuals
than a property to be demonstrated experimentally. The experimental question regarding
online sentence processing is therefore not whether counterfactuals can convey a dual meaning
(off line studies established that they can), but whether they always do and how exactly such dual
meaning relates to incremental build-up of sentence meaning. The available online sentence
comprehension studies show that counterfactual antecedents require longer processing time
when they contain novel factual meaning as opposed to given factual meaning. They also show
that counterfactual events are immediately checked for consistency with prior discourse.
Furthermore, counterfactual scenarios are quickly incorporated into the representation of the
discourse so that they impact the comprehension of successive narrative. This process seems
to draw on working memory resources. However, online evidence for a synchronously dual
representation of counterfactual meaning at a specific point in time remains indirect.
Because the reviewed experimental findings are diverse and sometimes contradictory, inter-
pretation of the results must rely on the specifics of the counterfactual materials as well as the
control materials. Counterfactual sentences are usually contrasted with factual declarative
sentences (Because A, B) or with indicative conditionals (If A, then B). From the viewpoint of
incremental sentence processing, indicative conditionals may constitute a better control
condition in terms of matching conditional sentence-structure and suppositional meaning. This
is important, because observed differences in online processing can be attributed to dual
meaningwith more certainty when other differences are kept minimal. Another not often taken
but promising approach in the online investigation of counterfactual dual meaning is to focus on
counterfactual antecedents (Kulakova et al. 2014; Stewart et al. 2009). In the antecedent, both
the compositional meaning and its pragmatic enrichment are conveyed for the first time and can
exhibit potential processing consequences. Studying counterfactual antecedents is therefore
better suited to capture the potential computation processes associated with dual meaning than
investigating counterfactuals’ downstream consequences.
A more fundamental problem for research on counterfactual dual meaning during language
comprehension is its imprecise definition in cognitive theory and a missing link between
cognitive theory and incremental accounts of language comprehension. Although the theories
of mental spaces and mental models are probably the main cognitive reference for counterfac-
tual dual meaning computation, they both lack a direct translation into language processing
mechanisms and therefore cannot offer clear processing predictions for incremental counterfac-
tual sentence processing. Hence, what would count as direct online evidence for dual meaning
from a sentence-processing perspective? And, evenmore important, how can the notion of dual
meaning be falsified with online data? In general, there is no reason to expect that cognitive cat-
egories map on brain physiology or become distinguishable during online language processing
(Page 2006). For dual meaning computation to be detectable with current psycholinguistic
methods, it has to be computationally different (e.g. costly) compared to singular meaning
and to occur at a specific point or interval during sentence build-up. On the other hand, if on-
line measures fail to identify or support a neural process that can reasonably be associated with
dual meaning computation, this would not guarantee the absence of such a computation as it
might be variable in its time course or strongly differ between individuals. Studying counterfac-
tual dual meaning with functional imaging is associated with similar problems (Coltheart 2006;
Poldrack 2010). Although convergent evidence for increased processing costs can potentially be
gained from different methodologies and provide more precise descriptions of the neural imple-
mentation of counterfactual (dual) meaning computation, little can be done to convincingly© 2016 The Authors
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defining characteristic of counterfactuality even in psycholinguistic research and this leads to
circularity. Researchers design counterfactual stimuli with two meanings and then interpret
processing costs associatedwith counterfactuals as evidence of their dual meaning. It is important
to acknowledge this to move forward with meaningful experimentation.
In our view, this observation does not make neurolinguistic research on counterfactual dual
meaning futile. Rather it invites further online investigations to focus on the lack of bridging
assumptions between counterfactual dual meaning and online sentence processing. Online
studies can aim to clarify the how and when of dual meaning computation. This requires the
formulations of testable assumptions of how counterfactual dual meaning relates to incremental
sentence-build-up. Is it necessarily represented in parallel or are factual and suppositional aspects
of counterfactually accentuated in succession? What are the individual differences that account
for heterogeneous responses in off line studies that ask what information is implied by counter-
factuals (e.g. Thompson and Byrne 2002) and do they also have an impact on online processing?
Subjects’ sensitivity to contextual constraints and other pragmatic abilities (e.g. Ferguson et al.
2014; Nieuwland et al. 2010) as well as working memory capacity (Ferguson and Cane 2015)
are possible candidates.
In the light of the emerging refined pragmatic accounts of counterfactuality, further attempts
should also be made to relate counterfactuals to more popular pragmatic phenomena like pre-
suppositions or scalar inferences. The link between pragmatic skills and mentalizing (Cummings
2013) could further help to understand why counterfactual thinking and Theory of Mind
abilities develop hand-in-hand (Peterson and Bowler 2000; Riggs et al. 1998) even beyond
the effect of executive functions (Drayton et al. 2011, Müller et al. 2007). One possibility is that
pragmatic language draws on basic mentalizing skills (Sperber and Wilson 1986) and in turn
inf luences or predicts the development of explicit perspective-taking. Similarly, autists’
problems with counterfactual reasoning (Grant et al. 2004; Leevers and Harris 2000) might stem
from pragmatic deficits that impair successful counterfactual comprehension leading to further
problems with reasoning. Another future aim of experimental research on counterfactuals is to
establish an empirical link to the processing of simple modals, wishes and specifically negations
given that all these constructions convey a form of counterfactuality.
In sum, online studies of counterfactual dual meaning have and will provide valuable informa-
tion about the way counterfactual meaning unfolds in time and inf luences successive information
processing. Further advances in research on counterfactual comprehension require more specific
bridging theories about how counterfactual dual meaning impacts incremental sentence processing.Acknowledgement
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